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JUSTICE, INTEGRITY AND MORAL COMMUNITY:  
DO PARENTS OWE IT TO THEIR CHILDREN TO BRING THEM UP AS GOOD 
GLOBAL CLIMATE CITIZENS? 
 
ELIZABETH CRIPPS 
 
 
This paper asks whether parents owe it to their children to bring them up as good global 
climate citizens. Four arguments are considered, with increasing success: that there are social 
disadvantages to immoral behaviour; that moral integrity is required for a full human life; that 
the capacity for such integrity is so needed; and that the duty is demanded by the life-shaping 
parent-child relationship and the fact that parents have climate justice duties. Given this, 
enabling and motivating one’s child to respond to climate change is part of valuing that child 
as a future member of the same global moral community as oneself.  
 
I 
 
The duty to bring up one’s child as a good global climate citizen has two elements. A 
parent might facilitate her child’s becoming a good global climate citizen by educating 
him about harmful global climate change and the collective moral failure involved, 
explaining her own efforts morally to respond and not rendering him over-dependent 
on fossil fuels. Going further, she might promote his becoming a good global climate 
citizen by actively motivating him, for example by involving him in her own moral 
response.1 This paper seeks to defend both of these. 
 
Given limited space, starting assumptions are drawn from established literatures. I 
assume that parents (including adoptive parents) have certain duties to their children: 
to meet their physical and emotional needs in childhood, including providing any 
‘intrinsic goods of childhood’ (Brennan 2014, p. 35), and to prepare them for adulthood 
in their community. This includes educating them and cultivating the capacities for a 
full or flourishing human life (Brighouse and Swift 2014, pp. 62-66; Noggle 2002). The 
parent-child relationship is itself important to both ends (Brighouse and Swift 2014, 
pp. 71-76; Betzler 2015, p. 65). 
 
I also assume that present and future human suffering caused by climate change 
constitutes a collective moral failure, generating shared or ‘weakly collective’ (Cripps 
2013, p. 3) duties to prevent or redress it. This can be defended negatively via a 
collectivised no-harm principle or positively via a duty to organise to protect basic 
human interests if possible at reasonable cost to the duty-bearers (Cripps 2013, pp. 48-
51, 66-77; Goodin 1985, pp. 134-41; Shue 1980, pp. 35-64). Effective collective action 
would assign climate justice duties to individuals. However, individuals also have moral 
duties in the absence of a coherent collective scheme. These can also be referred to as 
climate justice duties (Caney 2014, pp. 134-5). They might be fulfilled by promoting 
collective action, minimising individual emissions or aiding victims directly.2 It remains 
																																																						
1 The facilitation/promotion distinction is borrowed from the debate on cultivating autonomy 
(Brighouse 2002a, pp. 66-82).  
2 One duty might be to limit the number of children one has, given the link between population and 
climate change (Conly 2015). This would not undermine the current argument. The duty to have no 
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open for debate which should be prioritised and how this varies across individuals 
(Cripps 2013, pp. 141-50; Sinnott-Armstrong 2005; Broome 2012, pp. 73-4; Baatz 
2014; Garvey 2011). 
 
Against this background, the extent of the argument can be clarified. I am not 
defending a duty to give one’s child a ‘deep green’ comprehensive conception of the 
good: one assigning intrinsic moral significance to the survival of non-humans or 
ecosystems (Caldicott 1986; Royston 1988). Moreover, my target is relatively affluent 
parents. As with many duties, considerations of demandingness are relevant. For the 
very badly off, it may be unreasonably costly to bring up one’s children as good global 
climate citizens. 
 
Further, while age-sensitivity is crucial, the duty makes some demands even on parents 
of very young children. Clearly, it is inappropriate to show a three year-old pictures of 
drought victims or expect him to grasp the collective moral predicament. This is a 
matter partly of emotional and cognitive readiness, partly of not undermining the early 
innocence that some take to be an intrinsic childhood good (Macleod 2015, pp. 59-60). 
However, lifestyle habits and ideological commitments can be acquired from early on 
and there is evidence that moral development begins in very young children (Dunn 
2014; Vaish and Tomasello 2014). 
 
Finally, a duty to bring children up as good global climate citizens might be derived 
directly from the duties owed by the affluent to the victims of climate change, given 
the need to involve the next generation. This is not the focus of this paper. Instead, I 
am concerned with what the parent owes her own child as a future moral agent. 
 
Given this, a natural starting point is the widely accepted duty to develop one’s child’s 
general moral capacity, arguments for which might be extended to the climate change 
case. Two of these are examined: the social penalties argument, which appeals 
pragmatically to social punishments for immoral behaviour, and the moral integrity 
argument, which considers good moral behaviour necessary for a full or flourishing 
human life (sections II and III).3 Both are found wanting in the current context. 
However, I offer a variant on the second, the moral capacity argument, to defend a duty 
to facilitate one’s child becoming a good global climate citizen (section IV). I then take 
a different line (section V). The moral community/relationship argument appeals on the 
one hand to the parent’s climate justice duties and on the other to the significance of 
the parent-child relationship. Sections VI and VII deal with likely objections, including 
the claim that this duty would conflict with developing children’s capacity for 
autonomy. 
 
																																																						
children is not defended. Moreover, it remains relevant what one owes to one’s children even if it was 
a violation of climate justice duties to have had them. However, an interesting related problem, not 
addressed here, is whether the affluent biological parent of a large family could or should explain 
climate duties to her third, fourth (and so on) children if this amounted to saying that they should not 
have been born. 
3 The duty to develop one’s child’s general moral capacity might also be derived from duties to third 
persons. However, this is not the focus here. 
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II 
 
According to the social penalties argument, immoral behaviour is practically 
disadvantageous. This has been variously expressed: ‘social institutions tend to reward 
moral behaviour’ (Brighouse and Swift 2014, p. 64; Noggle 2002, pp. 110-12) or 
children need a sense of justice to thrive in a society where their opportunities are 
constrained by collectively determined justice (Clayton 2006, pp. 110-12). Thus, the 
duty to develop moral capacity follows from the duty to enable one’s child to live a full 
adult life in his community. 
 
However, if this is the only reason for developing one’s child’s moral capacity, the duty 
to bring up one’s child as a good global climate citizen does not follow. There are no 
‘serious consequences’ (Brighouse 2002b, p. 42) of ignoring positive or collectively 
acquired negative duties to distant or future persons. Opportunities in affluent societies 
are not constrained by global or intergenerational justice. The argument extends only 
to giving one’s child a narrow nationalist morality: no serious individual harms, some 
positive duties to those with whom one shares both state and generation. 
 
The argument might be amended to appeal to the chance that climate justice will be 
incorporated into social and institutional arrangements during current children’s 
lifetimes. However, this is by no means guaranteed. Moreover, collective action might 
focus disproportionately on protecting the next few generations of the global affluent, 
rather than institutionalise truly global moral duties. This would, in any case, be a 
limited argument as it would not require enabling children to bring about such 
collective implementation of climate justice. 
 
Let us turn, then, to a different starting point: the requirements for a full (or what 
might variously be called a flourishing, a thriving or even a good) human life. 
 
III 
 
As human beings, we face the world from several perspectives (Cripps 2013, pp. 170-
75; Nagel 1991, pp. 1-10). One is that of our own interests, ambitions and values. 
Another is that of our interpersonal relationships with other individuals. These give us 
central reasons – and, in the latter case, moral duties – to act in certain ways. However, 
we are also moral agents in a more impersonal sense. From that perspective, we have 
central reason to prevent, and not to cause, severe suffering by human beings. (For 
brevity, I will refer to this as the moral perspective.)  
 
The moral integrity argument claims that a human life cannot be successful without 
success from the moral perspective: that moral integrity is necessary for a human life 
to go well. Moral integrity is here understood as living within moral boundaries 
(Dworkin 2000, p. 270). This argument is suggested by some in the parental duties 
literature (Brighouse 2002b, p. 42; Clayton 2006, p. 143)4 and makes the case for 
facilitating and promoting future moral behaviour as part of preparing children for 
																																																						
4 Writing with Swift, Brighouse is more equivocal (2014, p. 64). 
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adulthood.5 Given the link between climate change and human suffering, the argument 
would seem, if successful, to extend to a duty to bring up one’s child up as a good global 
climate citizen. 
 
However, the argument relies on a very controversial view of human interests. Given 
continued global suffering, claiming that future adults could not lead a full or thriving 
life without acting morally means accepting that most affluent lives are not fully 
flourishing even if those living them think they are.6 In the climate change case, it 
means accusing those who drive SUVs or lobby against fuel taxes not only of acting 
wrongly but also of acting against their own interests. The former I would often uphold; 
the latter is highly problematic. In some cases, it amounts to overruling a considered, 
informed, judgements by individuals of what is in their own overall interest.  
 
Instead, I will offer a less controversial argument starting from the same three-
perspective view of human life. This appeals not to the need for moral integrity but to 
the need for the capacity for integrity in a broader sense. This includes but is not limited 
to moral integrity.   
 
IV 
 
The moral capacity argument has two versions. The stronger version claims that the 
capacity (understanding and ability) for moral integrity is needed for a full human life. 
This is because all human beings are moral agents, whether or not they choose to act 
as such. The claim is less controversial than that underlying the moral integrity 
argument. It is less problematic to question someone’s own judgement on how well 
their life has gone if they lacked the knowledge or ability to undertake something 
widely regarded as valuable and so did not make a free, informed decision not to do 
so.7 The weaker version – still sufficient for much of the argument – appeals to the 
significant likelihood that any given individual will become motivated by the moral 
perspective, to the extent that her values and plan of life demand moral integrity. 
Parents have a duty to develop their child’s moral capacity because they cannot 
reasonably assume that this will not happen.  
 
In either case, the duty defended is to facilitate moral behaviour. However, a further 
step is required to defend facilitating becoming a good global climate citizen. Why not 
turn out one’s children with a general moral capacity and leave it to them to apply it to 
climate change? Because, I suggest, there are aspects of fulfilling climate justice duties 
that require specific preparation. 
 
																																																						
5 It might be claimed that either moral capacity or motivation need not be actively ‘developed’ since it 
is to some degree innate (Vaish and Tomasello 2014, pp. 283-4; Wynn and Bloom 2014; Rawls 1971, 
pp. 401-3). I do not enlarge on this since the parental duties literature assumes a role for parental 
influence. However, even if some level of capacity or motivation were innate, the knowledge and 
ability to apply this in a social and especially a global or intergenerational context would not 
automatically follow. 
6 Dworkin bites this bullet (2000, pp. 265-7). 
7 A significant literature in the capabilities approach makes a parallel point (e.g. Nussbaum 2000, pp. 
86-96). 
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Firstly, suffering caused by climate change is not immediately visible to the global 
affluent: it takes place in different parts of the world and in future generations. Thus, 
grasping the moral situation requires some knowledge of this likely harm and how it 
results from, and could be prevented by, combined human actions.  
 
Secondly, responding morally to climate change requires skills beyond the acts and 
omissions associated with individual-to-individual duties. This is not simply a matter 
of extrapolating from the ‘Don’t hit your sister, that’s naughty’ or ‘She’s sad, be nice to 
her’ that we drum into our children from toddlerhood. The individual needs to 
understand the collective situation, see his own place in it and use his judgement on 
whether and how best to promote collective change.  He needs global citizenship skills. 
 
Thirdly, not only do current societies not penalise failure to fulfil moral duties to those 
distant in time or space, socio-psychological ‘blocking’ mechanisms make them less 
likely to be fulfilled. This is well documented in general and in the climate change case 
(Lichtenberg 2004; Norgaard 2011; Stoll-Kleemann, O’Riordan, and Jaeger 2001). 
Enabling one’s child to act as a good global climate citizen involves giving him the 
insight to identify and see past such blocks.  
 
Fourthly, this paper has so far understood moral integrity as living within moral 
boundaries. However, integrity might be understood more broadly: as having the 
central aims, interests, and values of one’s life broadly in line (Cripps 2013, pp. 180-
95; Williams 1973, pp. 93-119). For those who motivated by all three human 
perspectives, central, pervasive conflict between them can be hard to live with. 
(Consider the child of slave owners, brought up ideologically committed to and reliant 
on slavery, who later comes to appreciate the its moral wrongness.8) This is so much 
the case that parents plausibly owe it to their children to spare them such conflict if 
they can. In the current context, this means not committing one’s child ideologically to 
a way of life incompatible with climate justice. It also means preventing his becoming 
so reliant on fossil fuels that he would struggle to secure central interests without them 
(e.g. through addiction to high speed, long distance travel).9  
 
A further point can be made specific to the climate justice case. Climate change may 
well harm the children and grandchildren of current children (IPCC 2014b, pp. 21-23). 
Thus not only the moral perspective but also the interpersonal one could clash with the 
future adult’s own interests and values if he is not brought up as a good global climate 
citizen. 
 
The moral capacity argument has defended facilitating, but not necessarily promoting, 
one’s child becoming a good global climate citizen.10 This prompts a challenge: is 
																																																						
8 Analogy adapted from Macleod (2010, pp. 147). 
9 Mitigating climate change effectively requires zero emissions by the end of the century (IPCC 2014a, 
p. 18). 
10 An alternative argument, not discussed here, is that it impinges on one’s future moral integrity to live, 
as a child, a life which would be immoral if lived by an adult. Thus, parents should actively involve their 
child in lifestyle changes made to fulfil climate justice duties. However, this goes well beyond the 
accepted view of moral accountability as requiring agency and avoidability. (For a related discussion on 
vegetarianism, see Butt (Unpublished).) 
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facilitation possible in practice without promotion? Probably not: in educating her child 
about the moral failures of climate change, the parent is likely to motivate him to 
respond.11 Given an original aim of defending both facilitation and promotion, it is not 
a problem for the argument if I have defended the former with the latter as a near-
inevitable side effect. However, it could make the argument more vulnerable to 
concerns about autonomy. This will be addressed in section VII. 
 
V 
 
The moral community/relationship argument starts with two observations: parents 
themselves have climate justice duties12 and parents and children have a peculiarly 
significant, life-shaping relationship. As the relationship contributes crucially to the 
child’s well-being and development, parents plausibly owe their children a certain 
quality of relationship (insofar as their own efforts can secure this). A case has been 
made for ‘familial relationship goods’: shared activities involving intimacy and mutual 
identification (Brighouse and Swift 2014, p. 110). However, it is also necessary not to 
undermine the relationship in a central way, for example by destroying trust. An 
extreme case would be a parent who ticked all the boxes in terms of quality time 
together, education, etcetera, but was revealed as living a double life with another 
family.  
 
From this starting point, the argument has two components, the latter reinforcing the 
former, and can take two versions: one defending only facilitation, the other also 
promotion.  
 
In fulfilling her moral duties, the parent acknowledges her place in the community of 
moral agents. In fulfilling climate justice duties, she identifies herself as a member of a 
global and intergenerational moral community: those entitled to at least basic moral 
consideration and required to show it to one another, by virtue of common humanity. 
The parent also knows that she is in an asymmetrically influential relationship with her 
child. Given this, someone who brings her child up as a good global climate citizen – 
teaches him about climate change, discusses her own response with him and enables 
and encourages him to respond – acknowledges that child as a future member of the 
same global moral community and prepares him to act as such.  
 
If she does not, something is missing from the relationship. This, I suggest, is a kind of 
respect: that necessary component of a truly human relationship. Respect for a child 
does not, of course, include all the elements of respect for an adult. It does not give the 
same weight to the individual’s own judgement. However, respect more generally 
involves properly valuing someone as a fellow human being. This includes valuing them 
as a moral agent or, in this case, future moral agent. In failing to help her child to 
understand and pursue the goals that she pursues as a moral agent, the parent is failing 
fully to acknowledge and value him as both her child, on whose development she has 
																																																						
11 Brighouse (2002a, p. 80-82) addresses parallel concerns about facilitating autonomy.  
12 This does not make my argument relevant only to parents already fulfilling such duties. To those 
who do not, the claim is that they should fulfil them (subject to caveats in section VIII) and, having 
done so, that they would acquire this further duty.  
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a perhaps unequalled influence, and a future member of the same moral community as 
herself.13 This milder version of the argument defends facilitating one’s child becoming 
a good global climate citizen. On the stronger version, more is required: actively 
motivating one’s child to act as such, including by involving him in one’s own fulfilment 
of climate justice duties. The claim is that this, too, is required properly to value him 
as a future fellow member of the global moral community, given the asymmetric 
relationship. 
 
Bringing up one’s child to fulfil climate justice duties is distinct from many other ways 
in which parents might, or might not, enable and motivate him to pursue the same 
activities as themselves. The relationship, however intimate, does not necessitate 
cultivating a passion for Manchester United, mountain biking or chess (so long as some 
mutually valued shared activities are undertaken). However, considering the child as a 
future member of the global moral community, parental failure to prepare him to 
respond morally to climate change is akin to not teaching him the language of the 
country in which they both live. 
 
To reinforce the point, consider how this failure could undermine the relationship in 
the child’s eyes. Through her actions and inactions, the parent sends the following 
implicit message: ‘Yes, I am attempting morally to respond to climate change. This is 
because I identify myself as a member of a global moral community with a duty to 
respond appropriately to the serious suffering of human beings. I know I have a near-
unique influence on your options and prospects but I don’t see the need to help you to 
play your part in that community. It doesn’t matter to me whether you respond 
appropriately to moral need.’ Compare this with the unproblematic way in which the 
mountain biker might tell her child: ‘This is just something I’m into. That doesn’t mean 
you need to do it.’ The young child could not appreciate this distinction but the 
adolescent or young adult very possibly would. 
 
VI 
 
This section and the next deal with two objections. Both challenge the conclusion that 
parents should promote their children becoming good global climate citizens. However, 
I cannot retreat from them by upholding only a facilitation duty: as noted above, the 
two are probably inseparable in practice.  
 
The first objection criticises the moral community/relationship argument for taking 
parents’ climate justice duties as the background against which to establish their 
parental duties. In fact, it claims, it is widely held that the reverse holds: parents can 
																																																						
13 Bou-Habib (2014) argues that the parent who flouts general moral duties to confer special 
advantage on her child fails to value that child properly because she cannot value her for her 
individual worth whilst acting incompatibly with recognising that of others. The claim here is 
narrower: the parent cannot simultaneously perform her moral duties, appreciate the significance of 
the parent-child relationship and properly value her child as a future fully fledged human being, 
without cultivating and promoting his moral capacity. 
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permissibly do the best for their children before worrying about duties to distant 
strangers.14 Given this, we should compare two scenarios:  
 
(A) Parents fulfil their climate justice duties and so acquire duties to bring 
children up as good global climate citizens. 
(B) Parents do not fulfil their climate justice duties.  
 
The objector argues that A is worse for the child because, despite some individual 
efforts, effective collective-level climate justice may not happen. Thus, a child 
motivated to pursue it could face a lifetime of frustration. As many people are not so 
motivated, she could also face social exclusion. Thus, the parent isn’t required to fulfil 
her climate justice duties and the further duty does not follow.  
 
This objection fails.15 In rejecting it, however, it is helpful to break it into two versions 
drawing on the difference between securing one’s child a reasonably good childhood 
and opportunities, and continually boosting his prospects beyond this.16 
 
(i) Parents should opt for scenario B because A would put the child below 
the threshold for a reasonably good life. 
(ii) Although children need not fall below the threshold even in A, their lives 
would be harder than under B. Thus, parents can still legitimately opt for 
B. 
 
On version i, the premise can be rejected. There is no reason to regard motivation to 
act morally on climate change as incompatible with a good human life. Even with 
uncertain prospects for collective action, the parent is not signing her child up to an 
isolated life committed exclusively to some esoteric and implausible end. She is 
enabling him to understand the moral wrongness of the collective situation – something 
many people do appreciate – and encouraging him, among other things he may do, to 
respond to it: an ambition around which communities are already being built. 
 
On version ii, there are two responses. The explicit premise can be challenged: the 
claim that it is worse to be morally motivated to respond to climate change than not. 
Collective moral failure can make life harder for those who are morally motivated 
(Cripps 2013, pp. 170-96). However, building on section IV, conflict between the moral 
and personal perspectives should be reduced by being brought up as a good global 
climate citizen. The child will have less vested interest in climate injustice. At the least, 
there is reason to think that someone able and motivated to be a good global climate 
citizen would be better off than someone lacking even the capacity. Moreover, the 
moral perspective is not the only one at stake: current children are likely to have strong 
interpersonal reasons for climate action. 
																																																						
14 It would be more controversial to suggest that parents can permissibly prioritise duties to their 
children over individual negative duties. However, individual participation in collective harms may be 
more like failures of positive duties in this respect (Cripps 2013, pp. 155-57). 
15 This response builds on recent work on legitimate parental partiality (Brighouse and Swift 2014, pp. 
115-48; Macleod 2010, 2002).  
16 ‘Good’ is used to set the bar higher than ‘adequate’ or ‘decent’.	
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However, the objection would fail even if the explicit premise held. This is because of 
a morally problematic implicit premise. Consider the following three claims.  
 
(1) Parental duties up to some threshold level take priority over global or climate 
justice duties. 
(2) Other things being equal, parents have a duty to make their child’s life better 
rather than significantly worse even above that threshold.  
(3) The duty in 2 can also be prioritised over global or climate justice duties.  
 
Version ii of the objection relies on claim 3 but this does not follow from its more 
plausible predecessors. There is nothing in the significance of the parent-child 
relationship or the needs of the child to justify unlimited license for parents to ignore 
the serious suffering of others. Thus, it is permissible to factor parents’ climate justice 
duties into the discussion, provided this is compatible with the threshold level duty. I 
have argued that it is, so the objection fails. 
 
VII 
 
The second objection is as follows. Parents are thought to have a duty to develop their 
children’s capacity for autonomy as part of preparing them for adulthood (Brighouse 
2002a, pp. 66-82; Betzler 2015; Brighouse and Swift 2006, pp. 164-68).17 This is 
plausible. Indeed, respect for the child as future fully-fledged human being, stressed in 
section V, demands it. However, it puts well documented obstacles in the path of 
religious or cultural upbringing (Brighouse 2002a, pp. 83-111; Brighouse and Swift 
2014, pp. 168-73; Clayton 2006, pp. 87-123; Clayton 2012; Callan 2002; Archard 
2002; Noggle 2002, pp. 113-15; Feinberg 1980, pp. 131-38). Various limits have been 
proposed, for example allowing value-sharing activities where necessary for intimacy 
goods but only so long as the child’s future ability to revise his views is protected 
(Brighouse and Swift 2006, pp. 149-74). How, then, can parents justify shaping 
children’s values by raising them as good global climate citizens?18 
 
I have two responses to this objection, both starting from the same point: in terms of 
bringing one’s child simply to accept any moral claim, the duty defended here is very 
limited. It is limited to the minimal claim that it is a moral failure collectively or 
individually to cause or (subject to a reasonable cost condition) fail to prevent serious 
human suffering. 
 
Firstly, bringing up one’s child as a good global climate citizen is compatible with – 
even conducive to – developing skills for autonomy. On perhaps the most influential 
account, being autonomous is ‘being part author of one’s own life’. Individuals need 
adequate long and short-term options, mental capacities and freedom from coercion 
and manipulation (Raz 1986, pp. 369-78). Thus, parents must enable their children to 
																																																						
17 I will discuss this as a duty to facilitate autonomy but parallel points would apply if the duty were to promote 
it. 
18 Note that the autonomy objection is not usually taken to overcome the duty to develop one’s child’s 
general moral capacity (Brighouse and Swift 2014, p. 151; McLaughlin 1984, p. 81). 
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think and reflect rationally, revise even their own considered views, and engage 
critically but constructively with those of others (Archard 2010, p. 158; Brighouse and 
Swift 2014, pp. 63-4, 164-68; Noggle 2002, p. 105). 
 
Unlike that minority of religious parents who reject aspects of scientific education for 
their child (S. M. 2014; Feinberg 1980, pp. 131-38), bringing someone up as a good 
global climate citizen does not involve isolating him from rival views or rational debate. 
Rather, it requires making him aware of the overwhelming scientific consensus on 
anthropogenic climate change (Doran and Zimmerman 2009).  
 
Moreover, educating one’s children need not mean ‘laying down the law’. A more 
Socratic approach is available and, in this case, particularly appropriate. Beyond the 
minimal moral view above, it remains up for debate what exactly being a good global 
climate citizen involves: whether individuals should prioritise promoting collective 
action (and at what level), cutting their own emissions or aiding victims, and how this 
varies with individual circumstances. Thus, the parent must not only explain what she 
doing and involve her child in that, but also discuss other options and encourage him 
to use exercise moral judgement. 
 
Secondly, the parent imparting the minimal moral view to her child is not imparting a 
comprehensive conception of the good.19 Parents may come to endorse the duty to bring 
their children up as good global climate citizens through comprehensive views, whether 
religious doctrines or views assigning moral significance to the non-human world. 
However, the case for the duty does not depend on this. The claim is that parents should 
impart a moral assertion so minimal that it could form common ground across different 
comprehensive conceptions of the good. These conceptions would have only to be 
‘reasonable’ in the sense of accepting that all human beings are entitled to basic moral 
consideration.20  
 
In practice, the principles underlying the minimal view are uncontroversial. Virtually 
no-one would deny the prohibition on serious harm while minimal positive duties are 
accepted even by some ‘nationalist’ global justice theorists (Nagel 2005, p. 130-32; 
Blake 2002, p. 259). The collectivised versions follow so intuitively from the individual 
versions that, anecdotally, I was often asked ‘Isn’t that obvious?’ when explaining to 
non-philosophers my efforts to collectivise them. Moreover, climate duties could be 
defended on either of these collectivised principles. 
 
By contrast, comprehensive views, deep green or otherwise, contain elements which 
could reasonably be rejected. Given this contrast, the duty to bring one’s child up as a 
																																																						
19 This response draws on (Clayton 2006, pp. 93-110, 42-3). 
20 This is a globalised but only minimally cosmopolitan understanding of the Rawlsian view that 
citizens need mutually reasonable common ground to live together given limited resources and 
different ambitions and comprehensive values. (Rawls 1993, pp. xxxvii-xli). Thus, the duty here would 
pass Clayton’s test for legitimate exercise of parental authority – they could ‘defend their conduct in a 
manner that cannot reasonably be rejected by free and equal persons’ (2006, p. 112) – so long as those 
‘free and equal persons’ are humanity as a whole. Clayton’s approach is state-orientated. However, the 
views may not be too far apart: he upholds a ‘minimal international morality’ and advocates educating 
children to lobby for a just foreign policy (2006, pp. 163-5). 
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good global climate citizen can be considered exempt (as deep green views would not 
be) from the requirement to make concessions to cultivating autonomy. This point 
might be made in either of two ways (Clayton 2006, pp. 142-3). On one, valuable 
autonomy is itself constrained by minimal morality: freedom to do wrong is not 
valuable (Raz 1986, pp. 378-81). On the other, there is genuine conflict between 
bringing one’s child up as a good global climate citizen and giving him maximal 
autonomy. However, the duty to cultivate autonomy can legitimately be overridden to 
the limited extent necessary given the centrality of the minimal view for the moral 
agent and the fact that the two duties share a starting point: preparing the child for 
adult human life. 
 
VIII 
 
This paper has defended a duty to give one’s child the ability and understanding for 
good global climate citizenship. This includes educating him about climate change and 
the collective moral failures involved, discussing one’s own moral response with him, 
cultivating his moral judgement and avoiding ideological or practical over-dependence 
on continued climate injustice. In practice, this will probably motivate him to respond 
morally to climate change. However, it has been more tentatively argued that his 
parents should actively encourage this, including by involving him in their fulfillment 
of climate justice duties. 
 
In conclusion, two outstanding questions must be acknowledged: why climate change 
and why parents? Climate justice duties are not affluent individuals’ only moral duties, 
nor the only ones associated with global-level suffering. My argument might also apply 
to others. In some ways this versatility is an advantage. However, the point could be 
pressed as a challenge. If the parent could respond to human suffering in many ways 
and cannot, given demandingness considerations, be expected to do so in all of them, 
why should she prioritise climate justice? If she focuses instead on (say) global poverty, 
would not the moral community/relationship argument defend bringing up her child 
to respond to that instead? 
 
Not necessarily. If there is no strong reason for prioritising climate justice duties, much 
of this paper still stands. However, the duty defended is to bring one’s child up as a 
good global citizen. The role for moral judgement comes, as it were, one level up: the 
parent should explain her own focus on global poverty or climate change but highlight 
other pressing challenges and encourage her child to use his own judgement on how 
to play his part in the global moral community. I would be content to have defended 
this. However, I have focused on climate justice duties because there are reasons for 
giving them special priority. A detailed account lies beyond this paper but, briefly, 
climate change has a peculiar practical urgency. Not only does it exacerbate many other 
global challenges but it will become exponentially worse without effective action in the 
next few decades (IPCC 2014a, pp. 16-19). Moreover, it counts as moral failure on 
positive or negative accounts of what we owe to one another as human beings. This 
gives it peculiar salience. 
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Finally, why are these parents’ duties? Should not the state educate children about 
climate justice? Very probably. Moreover, parents are not the only influence on their 
children’s moral development. Others include schools, peers, media, social media, other 
family members, and rival cultural influences outside the home (Carlo 2014, pp. 213-
18; Goodnow 1997). However, it remains important to explore parents’ duties. 
Whoever bears primary responsibility for securing a child’s interests and opportunities 
– states, parents, all of us – it is plausible that parents should endeavour to fill the gap 
when provision is not made elsewhere. Moreover, there are some things only parents 
can do. A child’s early lifestyle is largely determined by them. They could also 
undermine schools’ efforts. (Imagine being taught climate science, then going home to 
be told that it is all nonsense.)  
 
A further reason for focusing on parents was generated by the moral 
community/relationship argument. This emphasised the importance of moral 
education for the parent-child relationship which is key to childhood flourishing and 
future opportunities. As so often in the parenting debate (Brighouse and Swift 2014, 
pp. 70-76; Schrag 2008, pp. 200-06), this is not simply a matter of certain things being 
done for the child but of them being done for him by his parents.21 
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